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II. SUMMARY OF REPLY ARGUMENT
The present appeal should not be dismissed. The facts do not justify such a
drastic action in light of the facts and the record on appeal.
The duty to marshal the evidence does not apply to issues of law and rulings
of the Trial Court regarding the law such as the application of the law to the
facts.
The Trial Court ruling on the validity or competency of the medical doctor to
testify regarding the nature and the extent of the Petitioner's mental illness and
any occupational disability is erroneous as a matter of law.
When a person is mentally disabled, income may not be imputed to him. The
Statute requires the entry of specific findings of fact which were never made
in the case.
An individual cannot be imputed any income when there is no "voluntary"
underemployment or unemployment. This is a threshold criteria that must be
met and is statutorily mandated. The Trial Court failed to enter any findings
of fact on this critical issue.
Self-employment income is subject to specific statutory rules that must be
complied with in order for a support order to be properly entered. The Court
must specifically compare both current and historic net earnings of each parent
and must enter specific findings of fact as to the analysis made. This was not
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done by the Trial Court.
7.

A Support Order cannot be retroactively modified where the initial order was
part of a contested hearing. Such a modification is statutorily barred. The
Court did not disclose adequate reasons for its ruling on retroactivity.

8.

The Court ruling on contempt was improper as a misapplication of the law.
The Court failed to obtain jurisdiction over the subject matter and over the
nominal Defendant. No legal process was ever generated.

9.

The Respondent's continued reference to matters outside of the record on
appeal is improper. The intent in making the references is to prejudice the
Petitioner before the Court.
III. ARGUMENT
A. Introduction to the Reply Brief.

The Petitioner's Reply Brief will respond to the issues addressed in the Respondent's
Response Brief.
(Standard of Review on Legal Rulings)
The issues raised in this appeal are matters of law or rulings based upon the governing
law. An erroneous ruling of law or the misapplication of the law can be upheld on appeal
only when the error of law is harmless. Deborah Martinez v. Ed Martinez 652 P.2d 934
(Utah 1982). No deference is given to the Trial Court ruling on an issue of law or the
application of the governing law.
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B. The Appeal of the Petitioner Should not be
Dismissed at this Stage of the Proceedings.
The Respondent strongly urges the Court of Appeals to dismiss the present appeal
based upon events arising after the date of the entry of the Decree of Paternity. (Respondent
Brief pp. 6-7). This is extraordinary remedy that this is not easily granted. Exceptional
circumstances must be present. In support of this claim or relief, the Respondent refers to
matters that are not part of the record on appeal. The principle reason given for the seeking
of this type of relief is the factual claim that the father had, and always had, the ability to pay
child support and has simply refused to do so and that he always had the ability to comply.
In more direct words, the mental disability is feigned. This position is asserted without the
benefit of an evidentiary hearing on the allegations that have arisen since the date of the trial.
Indeed, the argument is asserted despite the uncontroverted testimony of Dr. Kotkas and
Harry Beazer, describing in detail the father's collapsing mental condition and the course of
the mental illness over time.
The parties, by Stipulation, agreed that the testimony of Dr. Kotkas was to be received
and taken into account by the Trial Court. (Record pp. 392-405; Addendum No. 5, at p. 21).
Dr. Kotkas described the medical condition of the Petitioner in his deposition taken
on January 3, 2002. The history of the medical condition can be summarized as follows:
NO.

DESCRIPTION

1

Severely ill (physically ill and severely depressed).

August, 2000

11

Panic disorder-anxiety.

Late 2000

14

1

2

TIME PERIOD

3

PAGE OF
DEPOSITION

!

NO.

DESCRIPTION

TIME PERIOD

PAGE OF
DEPOSITION

3

Clinical diagnosis of autoimmune thyroiditis (low
thyroid) and mental depression.

Late 2000

15

4

Clinical diagnosis of: (i) mental depression; (ii)
panic attacks; (iii) heart racing; (iv) severe anxiety;
(v) phobic anxiety; (vi) difficulty in breathing; and
(vii) fear and fright manifestations.

Late 2000

16-18

Severe clinical mental depression.

April 2001

25

6

Post-traumatic stress disorder (brought upon by the
break-up of relationship with the Respondent).

October 2001

7

Patient modestly improved, but the possibility of
suicide remains.

November 2001

8

Patient improved and is getting out of house at last,
but still mentally depressed.

November 20, 2001

31-32

Still phobic, anxious, and reclusive.

December 11,2001

33-34

Remains depressed, unstable mood, easily
depressed, phobic anxiety, easily overwhelmed,
and disheartened. Clinical depression remains.
Unipolar depression (i.e. only gets depressed) with
highly reactive component. Not able to cope with
daily stresses.

December 28, 2001
(See Note)

5

1

1
10

9

J

28-29
30

1

34-36

l_

(NOTE: The paternity trial was held on January 25, 2002, which is three (3) weeks after the deposition).

It has never been the position of the Petitioner or Dr. Kotkas that the mental illness
would remain the same or that it would never improve. In deed, an improvement in his
mental condition was even anticipated. (Dr. Kotkas Depo. pp. 40 and 76).
The Respondent claims in her brief that the Petitioner's actions are "willfully"
engaged in and therefore, the drastic remedy of dismissal of the Appeal is proper.
(Respondent's Brief p. 6). The characterization of the father's medical condition based upon
the fact that there has been some very modest recovery, is not evidence of any willful
misconduct or deceitful conduct. The allegations of deceit post-trial are based upon "facts"
4

which have never been proven. The Respondent relies upon matters outside the record to
support its position that the Appeal should be dismissed. This is clearly improper legal
argument.
C. The Requirement of the Marshaling of Evidence
Does Not Apply to Legal Rulings Made by the Court
and the Misapplication of the Governing Law.
The duty to marshal the evidence in a case only applies to the extent a party is
contending that a factual matter was erroneously decided by the Trial Court. The duty does
not apply to legal rulings made by the Court.
A Court is required to make numerous legal rulings in a given case. Legal rulings
typically can include such things as: (i) the admissibility of evidence; (ii) the competency of
a witness; (iii) the application of the Rules of Evidence in the case; (iv) the selection of the
law to be applied in the case; and (v) the legal conclusion to be drawn from the application
of law to the proven facts.
The present appeal involves issues of law, the application of the statutory law to the
facts, and what statutory law is to be applied in the case.
D. The Court's Ruling on the Validity or Competency of the
Expert's Testimony as to the Patient's Mental Impairment
is Erroneous as a Matter of Law.
By Stipulation and consent, the medical testimony of Dr. Kotkas was received by the
Court as evidence in the case. Dr. Kotkas was well qualified as an expert witness. The
doctor described his training and professional experience as follows:
5

NO

DESCRIPTION

PAGE OF
DEPOSITION

1

Licensed psychiatrist.

4

J

2

Member of College of Physicians and Surgeons.

4

J

3

Licensed physician specializing in psychiatry.

5

J

4

BS Degree in 1954 and MD Degree in 1956.

5

J

5

Psychological Degree in Medicine from University
of London (1964) and Second Medical Degree
from the University of Leeds.

6

Private practice in psychiatry since 1966 in
Lethbridge, Alberta, Canada (35 years of clinical
experience).

5-6

6

The Trial Court erroneously ruled, as a matter of law, that a licensed psychiatrist
cannot determine if a person is impaired to a degree that would prevent the person from
engaging in his present occupation or in another occupation.

(Record pp. 392-405;

Addendum No. 5, at p. 23, ^|10). This is a legal ruling or legal conclusion. It is erroneous.
This is exactly what medical doctors specializing in psychiatry do for society. A disability,
which the law is willing to recognize, is not limited to only those cases where a physical
injury or insult is present. Mental illness is now a well recognized and documented medical
matter. It touches both old and young, rich and poor. Medical insurance policies now cover
mental illness. A recognized medical specialty now exists because of this type of illness.
There are millions of Americans who suffer from mental illness either slightly or
significantly. This includes Utah lawyers. The mental illness that affects lawyers was a
matter of a recent article written by Jack M. Morgan, Jr. Mental Illness, Addiction and
Attorney, Utah Bar Journal, Volume 17, No. 6, p. 14 (Aug - Sept 2004). This article
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described the impact that Utah lawyers may readily experience when they suffer from some
form of mental illness. The article encourages lawyers to seek help. This is exactly what the
Petitioner did when his mental depression became symptomatically severe. While it is true
that he had modest symptoms of the illness for a few years, they were not disabling. What
triggered the mental illness was the termination of the relationship by the Respondent.
It is undisputed that a medical school-trained physician is a recognized professional.
Some physicians choose to treat sick minds. Psychiatrists are specially trained physicians
whom society recognizes as being able to treat mental illness. It is part and parcel of the
doctor's occupation to determine the nature and the extent of a patient's mental illness. The
treating doctor then adopts a plan to help "cure" (i.e. treat) the mental condition. This is not
new science or an unproven medical theory. The medical diagnosis of Dr. Kotkas was based
on a criteria established by the American Psychiatric Association's description of the type
and the nature of the mental illness. (Dr. Kotkas' Depo. p. 37).
Dr. Kotkas provided his credentials and training to the Court. He has been a treating
psychiatrist for over 35 years. His qualifications or competency to testify in this medical
field was not challenged in the Trial Court. The medical testimony of the expert was
received as evidence by Stipulation. (Record pp. 392-405, ^|5; Addendum No. 5, at p. 21,
Tf5). The Respondent, in her Response Brief, now asserts that this testimony was not
admissible and was self-serving. (Response Brief p. 9). A doctor's testimony regarding his
patient's medical condition and its impact on the patient life is not self-serving. It is
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essential.
The expert medical evidence, as to the nature and the extent of the mental illness of
the father, was not rebutted by any other medical evidence. The testimony o f the Respondent
as to the Petitioner's mental health that existed prior to the date of the break-up is not
significant. It was the break-up in the relationship that led to the severe mental illness.
Indeed, the mother has no personal knowledge of the Petitioner's mental condition since the
date they separated. He is living in Canada, she is living in Utah with the children. She has
no personal knowledge whatsoever about the nature and extent of his disability and how it
affects his daily activities and functioning.
E. The Law Does Not Allow Income to be
Imputed to a Disabled Individual.
The central legal issue is whether or not a person's significant mental illness is a
voluntary act resulting in underemployment? UCA §78-45-7.5(d)(2) provides that a person,
who is significantly disabled, cannot be subject to the imputation of income for child support
purposes.
As was recently reported in the Utah Bar Journal by the article written by Jack M.
Morgan, Jr., statistically there are at least 570 Utah lawyers who suffer from a depressive
mental illness. The article points out that mental illness can be lethal. It can and does
destroy careers, jobs, social relationships, and leads to disciplinary matters. Mental Illness,
Addiction and Attorneys Utah Bar Journal, Volume 17, No. 6, at p. 14 (Aug - Sept 2004).
The existence of a significant mental illness necessarily prevents the satisfaction of
8

the threshold requirement that the parent be "voluntarily" unemployed or underemployed.
There is no evidence whatsoever that suggests that the Petitioner's mental illness was
intentionally brought upon himself. The law cannot impute income to a parent until it is
shown that the lack of employment income is due to a voluntary act of the parent. Virginia
Hall v.Blaine Hall 858 P.2d 1018 (Utah Ct. App. 1993) (reversing the imputation of income
to a parent where no specific findings of fact were made as to why and how the individual
was voluntarily underemployed).
The Court made no finding of fact that addresses the central issue which is whether
the lack of current employment income is the direct result of some voluntary act of the
Petitioner. The few findings of the Court, on this entire subject, is contained in f 8
throughTJ14. (Record pp. 392-405; Addendum No. 5, at pp. 22-25). None of these findings
describes how the mental illness was voluntarily encountered. The threshold element has not
been satisfied by the entry of any elucidating findings of fact. The "why" and "how" is not
identified.
The Petitioner was severely disabled as a result of his mental illness. The diagnosis
of Dr. Kotkas of the Petitioner's condition consisted primarily of: (i) severe clinical
depression; (ii) panic attacks; and (iii) phobic anxiety. It is clear that these symptoms existed
from the outset of care and treatment of the patient. (Dr. Kotkas5 Depo. p. 20). In his
deposition, the Doctor testified, in detail, about the progress of the mental illness over time.
The symptoms experienced were generally described as "typical" of the mental illness. None
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of these symptoms are the result of a voluntary act of the Petitioner.
The medical condition remained quite severe and unchanged from about August of
2000 to April of 2001. (Dr. Kotkas Depo. p. 25). The medical condition is aggravated by
such simple things as stress and anxiety. A very stressful factor affecting his medical
condition was the break-up of the romantic relationship between the Petitioner and the
Respondent. (Dr. Kotkas' Depo. p. 26). The personal relationship was terminated by the
Respondent. (Trial Transcript pp. 13 and 55).
The doctor's medical opinion was that the Petitioner's depression and mental illness
was so severe that he could not work. (Dr. Kotkas' Depo. pp. 39-40). There was no report
made to Dr. Kotkas of any gainful work that was being performed or engaged in by the
patient. (Dr. Kotkas' Depo. p. 27).
In late 2001 (just a month or so prior to the commencement of the paternity trial), the
Doctor described the Petitioner's mental condition as being severe enough to impair his
occupational abilities. (Dr. Kotkas' Depo. pp. 38-39). This clinical medical finding was
based upon medically recognized criteria (DSM) that demonstrated that Mr. Beazer had
serious social and occupational impairment. This is an Axis V diagnosis. The doctor notes
that the patient has not worked since about February of 2000. (Dr. Kotkas' Depo. pp. 38-39).
The reason for this inability to work is his severe and disabling mental illness.
Dr. Kotkas specifically testified that the Petitioner was so mentally ill that he could
not work as a lawyer. (Dr. Kotkas' Depo. pp. 40-41, 63, 67-68, and 86). Lawyers are not
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immune from the disabling effects of a significant mental illness. The Petitioner was not
taking care of himself and was unable to care for himself. This is a common symptom of
mental illness. The Petitioner was being cared for by his parents and family. His mental
disability was profound and life altering. It may never be "cured", but it may be controlled
at some future date.
Dr. Kotkas testified that the mental illness was not expected to improve in the next
year or two (2). (Dr. Kotkas5 Depo. pp. 40 and 76). The fact that a doctor recommends
therapy in the form of returning to school or some job retraining in order to reduce stress is
not evidence of "voluntary" underemployment or voluntary unemployment. The therapy was
a suggestion intended to treat his mental illness and not a statement that the Petitioner was
cured and thus ready to re-enter the job market.
The Court failed to make any finding that meets the threshold requirement that the
lack of employment or underemployment was the direct result of a voluntary act of the
Petitioner. This is an error of law. The ruling regarding imputed income must be reversed.
F. Self-Employment Income Must be Annualized
and May Take Into Account Historic Earnings.
Aside from the mental illness issue, a second important legal issue is how is the
underemployment to be determined? The law to be applied and process to be followed is set
forth in various statutes. UCA §78-45-7.5(5)(a) provides that gross income is to be
computed on an annual basis and then recalculated to arrive at an average gross monthly
income. The Courts generally use a calendar year for this purpose. Child support is based
11

upon the gross monthly income of the parents. This income calculation is very important for
self-employed persons whose income can vary significantly during the year and over the
years. The requirement of annualizing income is intended to address these situations.
Without this annualization of income, a fair support order cannot be entered. The support
guidelines requires the Court to annualize the income of the parents before support is set.
Even if one assumes that the law allows gross income to be interpreted to mean gross
monthly receipts, then the gross receipts of the Petitioner, as reported on the 1099 Forms
from Dental Select for 1998, is $3,383.00 (i.e. $40,600.00 divided by 12) and for 1999, it is
$2,975.00 (i.e. $35,700.00 divided by 12). The Trial Court clearly failed to annualize the
gross receipts for each calendar year in order to determine the level of child support to be
paid. Thisisanerror of law. It is a misapplication of the law. Under the statute, the Court
must first annualize the gross income of the parent then divide the amount by twelve (12) in
order to arrive at the gross monthly income for child support purposes. This income
calculation must be made before the Court can determine if a parent is voluntarily
underemployed. The test is to compare current income to the parent's historic income.
The Trial Court adopted as the income of the Petitioner the mean income that is
earned by Utah lawyers. This was in the sum of $8,640.00 per month. (Record pp. 278-284;
Addendum No. 7, p. 48). ($49.85 X 8 hours per day x 22 work days per month = $8,773.60).
A Court cannot impute income to a parent except as provided by law. The governing
law is found in UCA §78-45-7.5(5)(c). The statute reads as follows:
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Historical and current earnings shall be used to determine whether an
underemployment or overemployment situation exists. (Emphasis added.)
Before a Court can impute income to a parent, it must compare both the current
income and the historical income of the parent. This is a statutory requirement. The Trial
Court did not engage in this analysis in the present case.
There can be no dispute that there is a significant difference between the amount of
money reported on a Form 1099 as opposed to the amount of income reported on a W-2
Form. The 1099 reports to the Internal Revenue Service the gross receipts of the payee. The
Petitioner was self-employed. His gross receipts are reported to the federal government on
Form 1099. He was not an "employee" who receives net wages for his personal services.
The Petitioner is entitled to deduct from his gross receipts the cost of generating the income.
This did not occur. The Court made no effort to do so. The Court made no comparison of
a gross monthly income both currently and historically.
The only third party evidence the Trial Court had was the gross earnings of the
Petitioner from the 1099 tax forms which he received from Dental Select for the calendar
years 1998 and 1999. (Petitioner's Trial Exhibit 11; Addendum No. 12, p. 80). The Court
made no findings whatsoever regarding the Petitioner's historic net earnings. The Court
candidly acknowledged that it did not have sufficient evidence to make any findings of fact
as to historical net earnings from the Petitioner's occupation as a lawyer. (Record pp. 392405; Addendum No. 5, p. 26, Tfl6).
UCA §78-45-7.5(4) mandates that when a person is self-employed, the Court must
13

deduct from gross receipts the reasonable cost of conducting the business. This did not
occur. The ruling must be reversed and returned to the Trial Court for a determination of the
historical net earnings of the Petitioner as defined by the statute. Until this process is
properly engaged in, the Court cannot properly determine whether a person is either
underemployed or unemployed.
The Trial Court's Findings of Fact on the imputation of income are fundamentally
flawed because of the Court's erroneous legal conclusion that the psychiatrist is not
competent to testify as to the nature and the extent of the mental illness and how it affects the
employment and functioning of the patient. (Findings of Fact No. 10; Record pp. 392-405;
Addendum No. 5, p.23).
The Trial Court failed to make findings of fact in which it compared current net
earnings to historical net earnings. In the absence of this analysis, the Court cannot impute
income to a parent. This comparison analysis regarding current and historic income is
mandated by the statute.
G. A Support Order, Once Entered,
is Not to be Retroactively Modified.
The law states that support orders, once entered, are not to be retroactively modified.
This rule of law is now set forth in several sections of the Utah Code. They include UCA
§62A-11-312.5(1) and §78-45-9.3(3). The provisions mirror each other.
The text of UCA §62A-11-312.5(1) reads as follows:
Each payment or installment of child support is, on and after the date it is due,
14

a judgment with the same attributes and effect of any judgment of a district
court in accordance with Section 78-45-9.3 and for purposes of Section 78-221.
The text of UCA §78-45-9.3(3) reads as follows:
(3) Each payment or installment of child or spousal support under any child
support order, as defined by Section 78-45-2, is, on and after the date it is due:
(a) A judgment with the same attributes and effect of any judgment of
a district court, except as provided in Subsection (4);
(b) Entitled, as a judgment, to full faith and credit in this and in any
other jurisdiction; and
(c) No subject to retroactive modification by this or any other
jurisdiction, except as provided in Subsection (4).
These two (2) statutes, along with UCA §30-3-10.6(a) prior to its redesignation as
UCA §78-45-9.3(3), provides that support orders are not to be retroactively modified. There
is no claim made by the Respondent or any ruling made by the Court that the exception
contained in UCA §78-45-9.3(4) applies to the present case.
A contested support hearing was conducted on January 10, 2001. The Trial Court
(after the results of the paternity tests was known and accepted) ordered that support would
be set in the sum of $394.00 per month. (Record pp. 68-71; Addendum No. 19, pp. 117118). The Petitioner did not attend the hearing. Indeed, he has not attended any of the
hearings in the case including the paternity trial. The Court based this award upon the
submission of the Petitioner's 2000 federal income tax return (Form 1040) showing an
annual income of $17,069.00.
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In the present case, the Trial Court modified the Child Support Order retroactively.
It entered no specific findings of fact to support its ruling on retroactivity other than to say
the support should have been higher. This is insufficient as a matter of law to retroactively
modify the Support Order already entered pursuant to a contested hearing. In addition, the
Court failed to find that the Support Order was the result of fraud upon the Court. It is
acknowledged that fraud upon the Court (if proven) may be a basis to correct the Order. It
is undisputed that the initial Order of Support entered by the Court pursuant to the hearing
conducted on January 10, 2001, was a contested matter. (Record pp. 134-137; Addendum
No. 19, pp. 116-119).
Any inconsistencies between UCA §30-3-3(3) and (4) and UCA §78-45-9.3(3) must
be resolved in favor of the more recent legislative enactment and the more specific statute.
In such cases, the proper law to be applied by the Court is the statute barring retroactive
support modifications.
In fact, there are no inconsistencies between the statutes. It is true that UCA §30-33(3) and (4) allows support orders to be modified during the pendency of the case. However,
the statute is silent on whether it can be done retroactively. UCA §78-45-9.3(3) is not a bar
to a prospective change in a support order. It only bars retroactive changes. Interim support
orders may be modified prospectively but not retroactively.
The Respondent, at the time of the Order of Child Support was entered, urged the
Trial Court to adopt, as the father's income, his gross receipts. (Record pp. 68-71, ^|4, of the
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Orders; Addendum No. 19, p. 117). This request to set support by this means was properly
rejected. An allowance must be made by the Trial Court for the cost of generating the gross
receipts of a business or profession. UCA §78-45-7.5(4)(a).
The Trial Court specifically decreed that the $2,000.00 payment to be tendered by Mr.
Beazer (which concededly was not tendered) was to be a credit towards any support liability
that may be found due. This resulted in a double recovery of child support by the
Respondent. The Trial Court entered a money judgment for the $2,000.00 which was to be
treated as child support. (Record pp. 68-71; Addendum No. 18, pp. 112-113; Record pp.
406-412; Addendum No. 1, p. 4, ^|7). The Court then retroactively increased the level of
child support and entered a second money judgment for the full amount of the arrearages.
(Record pp. 445-447, ^[2; Addendum No. 2, pp. 8-10, ^[2). No offsets or credits were given.
This double recovery of child support (in the form of two (2) judgments) is made possible
by the misapplication of the law.
The portion of the Decree of Paternity to the extent it retroactively modifies and
increases the prior support order must be reversed. A money judgment for the arrearages
computed at the rate of $394.00 per month from the date of filing of the petition to the entry
of the Decree of Paternity is proper but it must then be reduced to reflect the amount of
money paid to the Respondent during the pendency of the case. (See Trial Exhibit 12;
Addendum No. 8, pp. 54-59). The Respondent in her brief asserts that the Petitioner has not
paid " . . . even a single penny of child support ordered by the Court." (Respondent's Brief
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p. 6). The allegation in the Respondent's Brief is made with full knowledge that such is not
true. The allegation is made with the sole purpose of prejudicing the Petitioner in this Court.
H. The Court's Ruling by the Entry of a Money Judgment
for Medical Expenses is Erroneous as a Matter of Law.
It appears to be conceded from the Response Brief filed by the Respondent that there
were no Findings made which support, let alone, identify a legal claim for exoneration for
the medical expenses relating to the minor children. The Respondent concedes, in her Brief,
that under the law respecting the right of financial contribution that a liability does not arise
until a party has in fact paid more than ones own allocable share of the actual liability.
(Response Briefp. 11). The governing statute for contribution in a domestic case for medical
expenses is found in UCA §78-45-7.15(6). The statute reads as follows:
The order shall require each parent to share equally all reasonable and
necessary uninsured medical expenses, including deductibles and copayments,
incurred for the dependent children. (Emphasis added.)
The Trial Court cited no statute or rule of law sufficient to enter a Money Judgment
prior to the Respondent's satisfying the elements necessary to establish a legal right of
contribution. It is undisputed that the mother has not paid any money towards the medical
expense which the judgment is based upon. She has certainly not paid

more than her

allocable share. (Trial Transcript pp. 71, 110-112).
The statute requires the Trial Court to allocate the satisfaction of medical expenses
between the parents on an equal (50/50) basis and it did so in the Decree of Paternity.
(Decree of Paternity ^5; Addendum No. 1, p. 3). The Trial Court, without a factual basis or
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other statutory basis, went far beyond the law and entered a money judgment on a
contribution claim that has not yet accrued. The legal claim for contribution may never
accrue.
The entry of a money judgment which must be paid to the judgment creditor (as
opposed to the payment of the medical expense to the medical provider) is improper. This
is an improper application of the law and should be reversed. Such a ruling invites the
possibility that the Petitioner will have to pay twice for the medical services. He may be sued
by the medical provider and the mother may seek to enforce her judgment claim.
The money judgment in favor of the Respondent should be vacated at this time.
I. The Claim of Contempt Was Never Properly Before the
Trial Court and Must be Reversed as a Matter of Law.
It is fundamental that a Court cannot act on any claim or allegation not properly
presented for a ruling. Properly presented means that the procedure necessary to initiate the
matter was in fact complied with by the party and then addressed on the merits by the Court.
It also assumes that any applicable Rules of Civil Procedure were also complied with.
The issue of contempt is not a small matter. It taints a party's reputation before the
Court. It is also important, because it can bring severe legal and economic consequences.
For example, it may prevent a party from successfully pursuing a valid claim. The procedure,
which is used to adjudicate a claim of contempt, must be complied with in order to insure
that the nominal Defendant is afforded due process of law. Failure to follow the state statute
on contempt and the governing case law is an error of law and must be reversed. State of
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Utah v.ArdenM. Barlow 771 P.2d 662 (Utah Ct. App. 1989).
The Court specifically directed the Respondent to apply for and have served upon the
Petitioner an Order to Show Cause. (Record pp. 134-137; Addendum No. 19, p. 117, ^[3).
This is procedurally necessary if the Petitioner intended to have the father held in contempt
of Court. The Order was clear as to what the Respondent was to do. Compliance with this
specific order of the Court is necessary in order to obtain a contempt ruling under UCA §7832-1, et. seq. The statute needed to be complied with and the Court so ordered. It is the
Respondent who has not complied with the Order of the Court.
No Motion seeking the issuance of an Order to Show Cause was ever filed with the
Clerk of the Court as required by Rule 7 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. This is a
significant procedural irregularity. State of Utah v. Arden M. Barlow 771 P.2d 662 (Utah
Ct.App. 1989).
The Respondent never sought out an Order to Show Cause. No Order to Show Cause
was ever served upon the Petitioner. The power of the Court to determine contempt was
never invoked. The Court never obtained subject matter jurisdiction over the claim of
contempt and never obtained personal jurisdiction over the nominal Defendant by having
legal process served upon him. Since no Affidavit or other initiating pleadings seeking
contempt were filed, issued, or served, it violates due process of law for a Court to cite a
party for contempt and then enter sanctions and a money judgment based upon the contempt.
The Respondent, in her Brief, states that the Court has "continuing" jurisdiction in

20

domestic matters. (Response Brief p. 12). This may be true as to many, but not all
"domestic" issues. For example, a change in custody may be pursued in the Court and in the
same case that initially determined custody, but it must be initiated by the filing of a new
Petition. It becomes a case within the case. Contempt is a significant new issue. It is a case
within the case. Just because the claim of contempt arises in a domestic setting does not ipso
facto mean the Court has jurisdiction in the case. The Respondent, in her Brief, also declares
that the Petitioner was, in fact, afforded all of his constitutional protections. (Brief p. 12).
This could not possibly be true. An Order to Show Cause and supporting affidavit was never
filed or served. There was nothing to defend. No notice of the specifics of the claim were
made under oath. This defensive claim, which the Petitioner was afforded his constitutional
protections, is wholly lacking in factual support in the record.
The Trial Court imposition of a contempt citation and awarding fees based upon the
same is void under the law and is unconstitutional. It is an error of law. It violates due
process of law. The award of attorney's fees cannot be justified on appeal by reason of UCA
§30-3-3(3) and (4). There were no findings made by the Trial Court which meet the
requirements for an award of legal fees based upon the standard of need and the ability of the
obligor to pay the same, which is the legal basis for an award of fees under this statute.
Anthony Rudman v. Evelyn Rudman 812 P.2d 73 (Utah Ct. App. 1991) (award based upon
financial need and the ability to provide the money); Rainer Huck v. Patricia Huck 734 P.2d
417 (Utah 1986) (financial need and the ability to provide the money).

21

The Trial Court declined to award any legal fees based upon showing of financial
need and the present ability of the Petitioner to pay the same. The fees cannot be supported
on this alternative theory where such specific relief was denied in the first instance by the
Trial Court.
J. The Respondent Erroneously Relies Upon
Matters Outside the Record in Order to Defend the Appeal.
In the present appeal, the Respondent relies on matters that were not part of the record
to justify her position in the case. (Respondent's Brief p. 6). This is improper. The Court
of Appeals has already denied the Respondent's request to supplement the record.
Notwithstanding the ruling, the Respondent attached to her Brief matters not made part of
the record. These improper records are attached as an Addendum to the Respondent's Brief.
It is done with the sole purpose of prejudicing the Petitioner in the eyes of the Court. They
should be stricken and ignored. These records consist of pleadings properly filed in the Trial
Court and were clearly filed after the date the Appeal was filed. The factual matters
contained in the District Court pleadings are hotly contested.
IV. CONCLUSION
The present appeal should not be dismissed due to willful noncompliance with an
existing order of the Trial Court. There is no clear and convincing evidence of any
willfulness in that the Petitioner has the ability to comply with an order and simply chose not
to comply.
The establishment of an order of child support at the rate of $1,239.00 per month
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effective from September 1,1999 must be reversed. It should be reversed as a matter of law
because: (i) it is the direct result of the misapplication of the law; (ii) the record fails to
contain findings of fact necessary to impute income; (iii) there are no findings made that
indicate the lack of employment is the result of a voluntary act; and (iv) the Court failed to
compare net earnings on a current and historical basis as required by law.
The judgment for medical expenses must be vacated since there is no finding that the
Respondent has paid more than her allocable share of the debt and may never do so. The
elements of contribution have not been met. It cannot be sustained on a claim of exoneration.
The support order was improperly modified on a retroactive basis and without an
adequate legal justification given for it. When a prior order is set in a contested matter, then
it cannot be modified retroactively.
The issue of contempt was never properly before the court and the court failed to
obtain jurisdiction over the nominal defendant. It is also procedurally defective to the degree
that it violates due process of law. The finding of contempt must be reversed and the
imposition of sanctions vacated.
Respectfully Submitted.
DATED this 8th day of October, 2004.
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